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作 者:黄晓红[1] 庄雷[1] 周勤[1] HUANG Xiaohong ZHUANG Lei ZHOU Qin(Southeast University, Nanjing 211189)
机构地区:[1]东南大学经济管理学院
出 处:《经济与管理研究》2016年第7期55-62,共8页Research on Economics and Management
基 金:国家社会科学基金重点项目"网络型差序格局的‘关系人’经济行为一般均衡研究"(15AJL004);国家社会科学基金项目"网络平台战略驱动的企业跨界成长研究"(15BGL076);江苏哲学社会科学研究重大项目"互联网金融产业的产业组织与政府管制研究"(2015ZDAXM005)
摘 要:本文从产业分工角度分析商业银行在互联网金融创新冲击下悄然进军电子商务领域的行为,揭示电商银行化与银行电商化之争的本质,阐明银行电商化的网络外部性收益驱动。基于个体有限理性,银行与互联网公司在电商竞争中的均衡策略是(进入,反击),短期均衡是银行电商化投资过度竞争并将处于亏损状态。基于网络外部性的作用,构建银行电商与在位互联网电商竞争的一般模型,采用仿真模拟两者竞争的趋势以及产生的均衡结果。银行逆向选择电商化策略短期投资亏损从而获得数据等网络外部性收益,产生"羊毛出在猪身上"的效果。From the perspective of the industrial division, the paper analyzes the behavior that commercial banks quietly entered into the e-commerce under the impact of innovation of internet finance, reveals the nature of dispute about e-commerce into banks and banks into e-commerce, and illustrates the drive of network effects on banks into e-commerce. For individual rationality, the equilibrium strategy that banks and internet companies in e-commerce competition is ( enter, counterattack), which means short-term equilibrium results that the investment of banks into e-commerce is excessive competition and will be at a loss. Considering network externalities, this paper constructs competing models of banks and incumbent e-commerce companies and adopts simulation of competitive trends to get balanced results of their behavior. It is found that banks which select adversely strategies into the e-commerce will get short-term investment loss and obtain network externalities earnings such as data,which is the effect of "the wool in pigs".
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