公平偏好下双渠道供应链最优定价策略与协调  

Dual-channel Supply Chain Pricing Strategies and Coordination Incorporating Fairness Preference

作　　者：林强[1] 魏光兴[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆第二师范学院生物与化学工程系,重庆400067 [2]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2017年第13期294-302,共9页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ1601409)

摘　　要：在市场需求是一种依赖于销售价格的线性结构下,建立由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级双渠道供应链模型.在改进收入共享契约下,分别针对零售商不利不公平厌恶和有利不公平厌恶两种情形,探讨公平偏好对双渠道供应链最优定价策略及契约协调性的影响.研究表明,最优零售价格随零售商不利不公平厌恶偏好增大而减小,随其有利不公平厌恶偏好增大而增大;最优直销价格不受零售商公平偏好影响,制造商始终完全占有直销渠道的销售收入;最优批发价格大小与零售商收入共享比例和公平偏好程度有关;改进收入共享契约仅在零售商不利不公平厌恶偏好下能够实现双渠道供应链协调.In the case of linear demand depends on the sales price, the paper develops a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain model with a manufacturer and a retailer who has fairness preference characteristic and studies the effects that fairness preference has on pricing strategies and coordination of dual-channel supply chain which take into considerations disadvantageous inequity aversion and advantageous inequity aversion respectively by a new revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the optimal retail price is decreasing with the increase of the retailer＇s disadvantageous inequity aversion, but increasing with the increase of the retailer＇s advantageous inequity aversion; The optimal direct price has nothing to do with the retailer＇s fairness preference and the manufacturer always holds the direct channel sales completely; The optimal wholesale price affected by retailer＇s revenue-sharing proportion and fairness preference together; The dual-channel supply chain achieves coordination only when the retailer has a disadvantageous inequity aversion.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 公平偏好 收入共享契约 定价策略 协调 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274