第三方监管能否提高中国环境规制效率?——基于政企合谋视角  

Can The Third Party Supervision Improve the Efficiency of China Environment Regulation?——Based on the Perspective of Collusion between Government and Enterprises

作　　者：刘朝[1] 赵志华[2] LIU Zhao ZHAO Zhi-hua(Applied Economics Post Doctoral Mobile Station, Xi＇ an Jiaotong University, Xi＇ an,Shaanxi,710061, China School of Economics and Finance, Xi＇ an Jiaotong University, Xi＇ an, Shaanxi,710061, China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学应用经济学博士后流动站,陕西西安710061 [2]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《经济管理》2017年第7期34-44,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"关于约束稀疏优化问题的理论;算法及应用研究"(11571271);教育部社会科学基金重大项目"新常态下我国经济增长动力转换和新经济增长点培育研究:理论;机制和实证"(15JZD012)

摘　　要：防范政企合谋成为提高环境规制效率、实现节能减排和低碳经济的重要措施。本文将第三方监管主体引入,构建了包含第三方监管主体、企业、中央政府和地方政府的四个利益主体的环境规制博弈理论模型,讨论第三方监管对地方政府和企业行为选择的影响。结果表明,第三方监管能够显著降低地方政府和企业合谋的倾向,并提高二者的环境保护努力水平。随后,采用我国2004—2013年省级面板数据为研究样本,实证检验第三方监管对环境规制效率的影响,结果表明,第三方监管不仅能够直接提高环境规制效率,还能够通过抑制政企合谋间接提高环境规制效率,总效应取决于二者的权衡,并且第三方监管对环境规制效率的影响效应存在空间异质性,东部地区影响效应高于中西部地区。2007 Nobel Prize for economics went to the three economists, who have laid theoretical foundation for the mechanism design and made a remarkable contribution, in order to reveal the important position of the mechanism design theory in the history of the development of economic theory. Principal-agent theory is an important part of mechanism design theory, which provides a theoretical guidance in the field of public goods or quasipublic goods ecological protection and ecological compensation mechanism design. Since the 1980＇ s, many scholars at home and abroad have applied the principal-agent theory to many ecological environment problems brought by the incomplete information （ Ferraro, 2008 ; Ozanne et al. , 2011 ; wei li et al. , 2006; Li et al. , 2014）. At the same time, the research of the foreign scholars in recent years also shows that the incentive mechanism, which is constantly improved, is one of the most effective ways to improve the efficiency of environmental regulation efficiency and ecological environment protection （Igo et al. , 2010; To et al. , 2012; Zhang ＆ Li , 2015）. With the deepening of the scholars＇ research on environmental regulation, more and more scholars realized the need to make a trade-off between environmental and economic growth. Simply raising environmental regulation intensity is less and less useful, and the improvement of the function of environmental governance and the efficiency of environmental regulation becomes more effective. It brings about a consequence that the research on environmental regulation efficiency has gradually become the emphasis of environmental economics, which is focused on environmental regulation efficiency measurement and influencing factors. （Randy ＆ Henderson, 2000; Zhang Huiheng, 2005 ; Berman ＆ Bui, 2008 ; Han Jiang et al. , 2009 ; Xiang-song Ye ＆ Peng Liang-yan, 2011 ; Cheng Yu et al. , 2016）. However, the research on the Third Party Supervision based on the perspective of collusion between government and enterprises i

关 键 词：第三方监管 环境规制效率 政企合谋 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]