节能减排政策与国有企业股份制改革  

Energy saving and emission reduction policies and Shareholding Reform of State-owned enterprises

作　　者：赵峰[1] 倪晶晶[1] 向洪金[1] ZHAO Feng NI Jing-jing XIANG Hong-jin(School of Economy and Trade, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学经济与贸易学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《经济数学》2017年第2期10-15,共6页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(No.71103059和No.71473082);南京审计大学科研创新项目:经济增长视阈下长三角地区产业结构优化升级问题研究(No.D10802900233)

摘　　要：除了经济效益,国有企业还大力推进节能减排,国有企业的民营化程度对污染排放存在一定的影响.在国有企业改革的环境下,构建了一个两阶段混合所有制寡头竞争的动态博弈模型,在实行减排补贴和征收环境税政策的条件下,分析了国有企业的民营化程度对污染物排放、社会福利的影响.研究结果表明:在实行减排补贴政策下,污染排放物随着民营化程度的提高而减少,在征收环境税政策下,污染物排放量随民营化程度的提高先增加后减少.For state-owned enterprises undergoing shareholding reform, this paper buih a two stage mixed oligopoly model by the method of game theory. And under the policies of emission reduction subsidies and environmental tax, this paper analyzed the effects of the privatization of state-owned enterprises on pollutant emission and social welfare.The research shows that, under the policy of emission reduction subsidy, pollution emission decreases with the increase of privatization level.And under the environmental tax policy, the amount of social pollutant emissions increases first and then decreases with the increase of privatization level

关 键 词：产业经济学 国有企业股份制改革 博弈论 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]