城市政府行为对城市用地供给的影响研究  

An Analysis of the Effect of Local Government Behavior on Urban Land Supply

作　　者：徐慧[1] 曾伟[2] XU Hui ZENG Wei(School of Acounting, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China School of Economic, Kunming University, Kunming 650214, China)

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学会计学院,云南昆明650221 [2]昆明学院经济学院,云南昆明650214

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2017年第4期100-108,共9页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"推进城镇化进程中的协调性研究"(13XJL007);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(第56批)"城镇化进程中的土地资源承载与城市经济可持续发展研究"(2014M562197)

摘　　要：文章基于理论与现实的比照,分析和阐释了在城市用地供给中城市政府的行为特征、行为影响及其行为趋势。研究认为,作为以促进城市经济增长为导向的适应性调整行为主体、城市土地产权的实际剩余控制者以及城市土地市场上的特殊垄断者和价格规制者,城市政府(官员)根据其自身效用函数,通过不断增加城市用地供给谋求其经济和政治利益。研究发现,城市用地相对供给过剩在我国较为普遍,城市政府通过增加城市用地供给可提高其城市土地收益占比。如果城市政府的城市土地收益占比越高,且土地要素产出弹性越大,城市用地的供给相对过剩程度也就会越深。城市用地供给中城市政府表现出短期机会主义和"逆市场化"选择的行为趋势,其产生的内在根源是中央与城市政府之间"激励不相容"的特殊政治委托—代理关系,城市政府之间非理性的价格竞争关系以及城市政府和微观经济主体之间模糊的产权关系。Based on the comparison between the theory and the reality, this paper analyzes and interprets the urban land supply from the behavioral traits, the behavior orientation and the trend of the loeal govern- ment. The result proves that the local government, playing as the adaptive--adjustment main body and the actual residual controller of the urban land and the special monopolist and price regulators of the urban land market, guided by local economic growth promoting and according to its utility function, strives for eco- nomic and political benefit by increasing urban land supply. Research in this paper find that the phenome- non of urban land relative excess supply in China is widespread; a city government could improve its urban land income proportion by increasing urban land supply. However, the higher of the urban land income proportion of city government and the greater of output elasticity of urban land, the degree of urban land relative excess supply is deeper. In addition, the local government shows the trends of short--term oppor- tunism and inverse--marketization, which are generated by incentive incompatibility of special political principal--agent relationship between local government and central government, irrational price competi- tion among the local governments and the vague property right relations between the local government and the micro units.

关 键 词：城市用地 有效供给 城市政府行为 城市经济增长 

分 类 号：F293[经济管理—国民经济]