论我国虚假陈述民事责任主体的困境与创新  

The Dilemma and Innovation of Subject of Liability of False Statements in China

作　　者：杨城[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100033

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2017年第7期70-78,共9页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：本文利用实证数据剖析我国虚假陈述民事责任主体单一化的问题,并将之与美国司法实践中责任主体的多元化进行对比。本文发现,我国《证券法》虽然规定了虚假陈述的多层次责任主体,但司法实践却出现责任主体单一化的结果,由此带来民事责任与行政责任不匹配、中介机构责任不凸显、控股股东、实际控制人责任虚化等问题。证券监管部门为强化中介机构的主体责任,利用行政权力主导推进保荐机构、主要股东对受损害的投资者先行赔付,并最终通过股票发行制度改革予以固化。先行赔付作为一种制度创新,承受着多方面的质疑。但先行赔付制度有助于解决司法实践中责任主体单一化的法律困境,欺诈发行中由保荐机构承担先行赔付责任,符合现实需要和法理基础。This thesis chooses subject of civil liability of false statements as research object, and intends to analyze the simplification of subject of civil liability of false statements by empirical data, while comparing it to the diversity of liability subjects in US practice. It is elaborated in this thesis that although multi-level subjects of civil liability are stipulated in Securities Law in China, subject of civil liability is always simplified in judicial practice. This leads to problems such as mismatched civil and administrative responsibility, less responsibility of security service institutions, and deficiency of responsibility on majority shareholders and actual controllers. In order to enhance the responsibilities of security service institutions, securities regulatory commission requires sponsors and major shareholders to compensate victims in advance and finally solidify this practice by stock offering system reform. As a innovative system, compensation in advance receives numerous queries. It is concluded in this thesis that the system of compensation in advance helps solve the problem of simplification of subject of civil liability of false statements. The requirement of sponsors to compensate in advance in fraudulent offering meets the need of legal principle and practice in China.

关 键 词：虚假陈述 责任主体 主体单一化 先行赔付 

分 类 号：D922.28[政治法律—经济法学]