基于业绩门槛监管下增发的长期表现:来自中国公开增发市场的证据  

Long-run Performance of SEOs Regulated by Profitability Thresholds:Evidence from Chinese Public Offerings

作　　者：陈欣[1,2] 杜威 张天西[4] 

机构地区：[1]云南大学,650091 [2]上海交通大学上海高级金融学院,200030 [3]深圳市创新投资集团有限公司,518048 [4]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,200030

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第6期53-59,共7页Accounting Research

摘　　要：中国证监会通过设定基于业绩门槛的要求,严格控制市场的股权再融资规模。本文对1998至2010年间公开增发的上市公司在增发后的市场表现进行深入研究。结果发现,与匹配的基准相比,我国公开增发的上市公司并不存在成熟市场中较为普遍的增发后弱势表现。此外,本文还发现公开增发后的超额收益与公司增发之前的ROE之间存在显著的正相关关系,这意味着基于ROE的业绩门槛有助于识别增发公司质量。The Chinese government strictly regulated seasoned equity offerings(SEOs)by setting profitability thresholds and other administrative requirements.We examine the long-run performance of Chinese listed firms making public offerings from 1998 to 2010.Inconsistent with commonly observed patterns of underperformance in mature markets,we do not find any material evidence of post-SEO underperformance compared with matching benchmarks.In addition,we show that the post-SEO abnormal return has a strong positive association with the prior roe of SEO firms,implying that roe-thresholds based on return on equity can be sound tools to identify SEO firms of high quality.

关 键 词：公开增发 长期表现 业绩门槛 再融资 增发后弱势表现 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]