不同兼业程度下政策性农业保险的静态博弈分析——以江苏省为例  

Static Game Analysis of Policy-oriented Agricultural Insurance under Different Degree of Part-time Farmers——Taking Jiangsu Province as an Example

作　　者：马宇贝 朱海星[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210037

出　　处：《安徽农业科学》2017年第20期224-226,230,共4页Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：2015年大学生实践创新训练计划项目(201510298006Z)

摘　　要：从农户兼业化的角度出发,以江苏省的"联办共保"模式为例,对政策性农业保险中农户、政府以及保险公司的利益博弈关系进行了分析,探讨了兼业化对政策性农业保险的影响。结果表明:随着兼业化的程度不断加深,农户对政策性农业保险的需求将会降低,在兼业化程度较高的情况下要实现有效合作,必须依靠政府的激励。From the perspective of part-timing of farmers, taking the model of ＂joint co-insurance＂ in Jiangsu Province as an example, we analyzed the interests and interests of farmers, governments and insurance companies in policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and explored the impact of part-timing of farmers on policy agriculture insurance.The results showed that with the increasing degree of concurrent industry, farmers＆#39; demand for policy-oriented agricultural insurance would be reduced, and the effective cooperation should be supported by the government in the case of higher degree of part-time farmers.

关 键 词：政策性农业保险 兼业化 博弈分析 

分 类 号：S-9[农业科学]