基于微分博弈的军民融合协同创新体系技术共享行为研究  

Technology sharing behavior in civil-military integration collaborative innovation system based on differential game

作　　者：赵黎明[1] 孙健慧[1] 张海波[1] ZHAO Li-ming SUN Jian-hui ZHANG Hai-bo(School of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, Chin)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2017年第3期183-191,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972117);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20100032110037);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630286)

摘　　要：针对军民融合协同创新体系中军工企业和民用企业的技术共享问题,构建微分博弈模型,分别考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈三种情形下双方的最优策略、最优收益及体系整体收益情况。通过均衡结果的比较分析发现:(1)双方的技术共享努力程度随着技术共享成本系数、技术衰减系数的增大而降低,随着技术创新能力系数、边际收益系数、技术创新影响系数的增加而升高;(2)"补贴因子"作为一种激励机制,可提高民用企业最优技术共享努力水平、双方最优收益及体系整体收益,而军工企业的技术共享行为保持不变;(3)在协同合作博弈情形下,双方最优策略及体系最优收益均严格优于非合作情形。为进一步协调双方技术共享行为,求得了能够使军工企业和民用企业的个体收益达到Pareto最优的体系整体收益分配系数的取值范围。最后利用算例分析验证了理论推导的结论。In the era of globalization and information explosion, the defense department and civilian department are adopting the modern science and technology in a similar manner because of the new military reform. Currently, there are two major issues. The first issue is about how to use science and technology resources to promote the military and civilian technology sharing. The second issue is about how to further realize the integrated military-civilian innovation. Technology sharing is critical to the construction of an integrative civil-military innovation system. It makes a big difference to build a national science and technology innovation system, strengthen national military modernization, and increase economic and social development. Existing studies have been undertaken primarily from the macroscopic and strategic perspectives. However, researches on the military and civilian enterprises from the micro perspective remains largely unexplored. The current study primarily aim to focus on specific problems by adopting qualitative analysis, rather than quantitative research with mathematical analysis. Therefore, this paper discusses the problem of technology sharing between a military enterprise and a civilian enterprise in the integrated, collaborative civil-military innovation system through differential game models. The conclusions obtained are expected to provide theoretical consideration for military and civil enterprises to make decision on efforts for technology sharing, incentive problem, game structure, benefit distribution, contract design, and other issues. For convenience of analysis, this paper focuses on an integrative, collaborative civil-military innovation system composed of a military enterprise and a civilian enterprise. In the first part, the related hypotheses and a research model are proposed. In the second part, the optimal strategies and optimal benefits of the military enterprise and civil enterprise, as well as the total benefit of an integrative, collaborative civil-military innovation sys

关 键 词：微分博弈 军民融合 协同创新 技术共享 协调 

分 类 号：F063.3[经济管理—政治经济学]