中国的地方官员何以晋升:激励与选择  

Chinese Local Cadres' Promotion: Motivation and Choice

作　　者：郦水清[1] 陈科霖 田传浩[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学,杭州310058

出　　处：《甘肃行政学院学报》2017年第3期4-17,共14页Journal of Gansu Administration Institute

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"地方官员政绩激励的生成机制与政策引导研究"(16AZZ013);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

摘　　要：对地方官员晋升机制的文献研究由来已久。通过对学术史的回顾,官员晋升领域的学术研究呈现出不断深化的趋势。就晋升锦标赛层面的功绩制晋升争论、硬指标考核下的淘汰型政治激励以及投资中博弈所带来的多任务应激结果出发,已有研究既有着相当的学术贡献,但又存在着分析层次、对象差异、操作机制以及实证方法等层面的问题。在此基础上,本文以标尺赛、锦标赛、资格赛与淘汰赛四种竞赛模式解构了官员晋升,并就未来的研究提出了可供深化的方向。The study of the promotion mechanism of local officials has been a long history. Through the review of the academic history, the research on cadres' promotion field shows a trend of deepening. On the promotion of the tournament level of the merit of the promotion of debate, hard-index assessment of the elimination of political incentives and investment in the game brought about by the multitasking stress results. The existing research has both considerable academic contribution, but there are problems such as analysis level, object difference, operation mechanism and empirical method. On this basis, this paper deconstructs the promotion of officials by division of 'Yardstick Competition-Tournament-Qualifying Competition-Elimination Competition' and puts forward the direction of deepening for future research.

关 键 词：官员晋升机制 功绩制 淘汰激励 投资博弈 官员晋升锦标赛 竞赛模式 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]