从维特根斯坦的“意义即使用”观看《哲学研究》中的确定性思想  

On Wittgenstein's Thought of Certainty in Philosophical Investigations——From the Perspective of “Meaning as Use”

作　　者：胡雯[1] Hu Wen(Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350007, Chin)

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学,福州350007

出　　处：《外语学刊》2017年第4期24-28,共5页Foreign Language Research

基　　金：福建省社会科学规划项目"维特根斯坦<哲学研究>中的确定性思想研究"(2014C019);福建省中青年教师教育科研项目"‘意义即使用’观与维特根斯坦的确定性思想"(JAS14094)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：维特根斯坦在其后期代表作《哲学研究》中提出著名的"意义即使用"观,部分后现代主义者以这一意义观为代表的《哲学研究》中的相关观点、思想为依据,尝试消解确定性,一些语言学者也藉此认为后期维特根斯坦已经彻底放弃对确定性的追求,转而关注语言意义的不确定性。然而通过对"意义即使用"观的仔细考察,我们发现,后期维特根斯坦并未停止追求确定性,他在这一时期追求的是一种语言意义"合宜的"确定性。In his later work of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein puts forward his famous insight of ＂meaning as use＂. Some postmodernists employ it and other related views in this work, trying to dissolve certainty, and some linguists believe that the later Wittgenstein completely abandoned the search for certainty and started to pursue the uncertainty of meaning. However, through a close examination of his ＂meaning as use＂, we find out that the later Wittgenstein has never ceased the search for cer- tainty, and the certainty he searches for in Philosophical Investigations is an ＂appropriate＂ certainty of meaning.

关 键 词：确定性 “意义即使用”观 语言游戏 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]