缔约中的信息困境、欺诈与私法干预  

The Pre-contractual Information Dilemma,Fraud and Intervention of Civil Law

作　　者：张铣[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学法学院

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第4期112-118,共7页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：信息不对称所导致的信息困境是当事人在合同缔约磋商中所必须解决的难题。在彼此间信息无法有效传递的情况下,欺诈便常常成为当事人突破信息困境的必然选择。面对普遍存在于磋商过程中的欺诈,私法应当划定合理的干预界限以在交易效率和交易安全中取得平衡。具体而言,这个边界应以一方正确设定的价格底线为基础,综合考虑双方的交易地位、信息性质等因素。从比较法上看,在这个边界以内,一种新的先合同义务类型——信息披露义务不但比传统规则更能实现对欺诈的有效调整,而且能助力于当事人突破信息困境,形成良性的信息互动并实现缔约公平。Information dilemma,which is the product of information asymmetry,is a difficult problem contractors must solve during the pre-contract stage.If information cannot be transmitted efficiently between contractors,contractors will always choose fraud as a useful approach to solve the dilemma.Confronted with so much fraud residing in the pre-contract stage,a boundary should be figured out in civil law to help us find a balance between transaction efficiency and security.This boundary must be drawn on the basis of floor price,with comprehensively considering elements such as status of contractors and characteristic of information.Within the boundary,the duty to disclose information,a new type of pre-contract duty,not only can do a better job of forbidding fraud than traditional rules,but also can help contractors solve the information dilemma and guarantee fairness in pre-contract stage.

关 键 词：信息困境 欺诈 价格底线 交易地位 信息披露义务 

分 类 号：D913[政治法律—民商法学]