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作 者:王昳玢[1,2] WANG Yi - bin(Graduate Department, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China School of Economics and Management, Baotou Normal University, Baotou 014030, China)
机构地区:[1]东北财经大学研究生部,辽宁大连116025 [2]包头师范学院经济管理学院,内蒙古包头014030
出 处:《云南财经大学学报》2017年第4期24-33,共10页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
摘 要:"优势企业"扶持策略作为中国高新技术产业政策的核心思路,其制度逻辑在于熊彼特假说——垄断地位对创新的强激励。但中国高新技术产业的发展现实使得重新审视这一假说的成立性成为必要。将转轨背景下"二元制"市场特征、"政府强干预"制度因子与高新技术产业的经验数据相结合对熊彼特假说进行再验证,结果表明,在竞争性的市场格局下,竞争才是微观主体创新的核心激励。因此未来中国高新技术产业政策的制度逻辑应该从优势扶持向市场公平竞争环境维护转移,才有助于形成基于市场调节的微观创新激励体系。The supporting strategy of "dominant firms" is the core of China's high - tech in- dustries, and the institutional logic of the strategy is Schumpeterian hypothesis -- the strong incen- tive of monopoly on innovation. However, the reality of China's high - tech industry development makes it necessary to reexamine the tenability of the hypothesis. Under the background of econom- ic transition, the paper reexamines Schumpeterian hypothesis by combining "binary" market char- acteristics and institutional factors of "strong intervention of government" with the empirical data of high -tech industry. Results show that under competitive market pattern, competition is the core incentive for micro subjects to make innovation. Therefore, the institutional logic of China's indus- trial supporting policy should transfer from supporting the dominant finn to maintaining the fair market competition environment. It is helpful for us to form the micro innovation incentive system based on market regulation.
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