官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善  

Official Turnover,Collusion Deterrent and Temporary Improvement of Air Quality

作　　者：郭峰[1,2] 石庆玲[3] GUO Feng SHI Qingling(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Peking University East China Normal University)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 [2]北京大学数字金融研究中心,200433 [3]华东师范大学城市发展研究院,200062

出　　处：《经济研究》2017年第7期155-168,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDB144);国家社会科学基金青年项目(16CJY065)的资助

摘　　要：城市主要官员在某地的长期任职会在当地形成一种关系网,加深当地政企合谋的氛围,纵容当地企业非法排污,而主要官员更替前后形成的政治敏感期会对这种政企合谋形成一种震慑效应,进而使得受政企合谋影响较大的空气污染物在短期内下降。本文将2013年12月至2016年6月中国160个城市的市委书记更替信息与城市日度空气质量指数和单项污染物浓度数据相匹配,研究发现市委书记更替前后,二氧化硫等受政企合谋影响相对较大的空气污染物浓度有明显的下降;而空气质量指数以及其他受政企合谋影响较小的空气污染物浓度则没有明显变化。进一步分析也显示,对于较长任期的市委书记或反腐中落马的市委书记,其更替前后二氧化硫浓度的下降更加明显。而且,市委书记更替带来的空气质量改善仅在短期内有效。Environmental pollution is not only an environmental problem but also a political issue, especially in countries like China where economic decentralization and political centralization coexist. In China, local government is responsible fur the implementation of environmental policies formulated by the central government. However, as environmental pollution is a public good with strong negative externalities, there is strong incentive for local government to ignore environment standanls and allow excessive pollution emissions from local enterprises, especially when contamination brings economic growth. In China, the promotion of government officials is highly dependent on the local economic growth rate during their tenure. Therefore, with collusion between government and enterprise, a ＂win-win＂ situation has been formed： on the one hand, local officials achieve political promotion and fiscal revenue, or even gains from eorruption; on the other hand, enterprises continue to maintain extensive operations while saving on the compliance cost of environmental regulations. In China, principal officials in local government possess great power. Therefore, the principal officials＇ long-term service forms a relation network that facilitates the collusion and conniving of local enterprises in illegal pollutant discharge and emissions. Thus, when the Secretary of the Commnnist Party of China （CPC） changes, a politically sensitive period creates a deterrent eft^ect on collusion. During this period, officials of all levels become cautious and meticulous, the environmental protection administration strengthens law enforcement, and polluting enterprises reduce illegal pollutant discharge and emissions. Thereh^re, the concentration of air pollutants, especially that created via collusion, decreases in the short term. In this paper, we match turnover data from the Secretary of the Municipal Committee of the CPC of 160 major cities in China with their daily air quality index （AQ1） data, as well as the concentration

关 键 词：空气污染 官员更替 政企合谋 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学] X51[政治法律—中外政治制度]