单路认证密钥交换协议的安全分析  

Analysis on Security of One-pass Authenticated Key Establishment Protocol

作　　者：赵燕丽[1] 刘志猛[1] 杜玫芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院计算机科学与技术学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《计算机与网络》2017年第13期73-75,共3页Computer & Network

基　　金：山东省科技发展计划基金资助项目(2014GGX101044);山东省高等学校科研计划基金资助项目(No.J12LJ04)

摘　　要：针对无线传感器网络邻近可信节点受到恶意节点的攻击,对一种基于双线性对的单路节点认证的密钥交换协议(MKM)进行了介绍,协议鉴别了参与节点身份的真实性,并协商出一个共享的会话密钥。为保护可信节点之间数据通信安全建立一个安全通信信道。通过在e CK模型下对MKM协议的分析结果表明,协议提出的安全模型不允许敌手通过查询并获取参与节点的长期私钥,限制了敌手的攻击能力,并且该协议不具备前向安全、抗密钥泄漏假冒等安全属性。To protect adjacent nodes in wireless semor networks against malicious attacks, this paper puts forward a secure one-pass authenticated key establishrnertt protocol based on computational Diffie-Hellman Problem on bilinear pairings. This protocol identifies the authenticity of participating node identities and agrees on an authenticated session key between any ：two adjacent seusor nodes, which can be used to establish a secure communication channel for sere data communication between trusted nodes. The analysis results of MKM protocol in eCK model show that the security model of the protocol limits the ability of the adversary, to attack, it does not allow an adversary to obtain the long-term private key of the participating node through the queries; and the protocol does not possess security properties such as forward security, key-compromise impersonation resilience, etc.

关 键 词：单路 认证的密钥交换 eCK模型 

分 类 号：TN918.4[电子电信—通信与信息系统] TN929.5[电子电信—信息与通信工程] TP212.9[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]