分析哲学与现象学中“意向性”的不同内涵  

Different Connotations of “Intentionality” in Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology

作　　者：毛红玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学人文学院,上海200092

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2017年第4期95-100,共6页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

摘　　要：分析哲学对"意向性"的界定比较明确,就是指向性。但现象学家们对"意向性"的内涵却有多种解释,这造成了比较的困难。布伦塔诺把"意向性"解释为心理的内含性,意向对象成了心理的内存在,实际上造成了认识论和存在论的双重麻烦。胡塞尔为了解决这个困难,把"意向性"解释为意识的构造性,又重新把意识的存在变得不可理解。现象学的真正独特之处,其实是对"意向性"中相关性的发现。In Analytical Philosophy, the meaning of ＂intentionality＂ is direetivity. But in Phenomenology, there are many different explanations. Brentano determinated ＂intentionality＂ as mental inclusion. Intentional object become internal being in mind, with a result that dual problems came in to being in epistemology and ontology. Husserl interpreted it as the constitution of consiousness, and maked the being of consiousness inexplicable. The ture discovery of Phenomenology is correlation.

关 键 词：意向性 内含性 构造性 相关性 

分 类 号：B151[哲学宗教—世界哲学]