环境规制下企业绿色技术创新的演化博弈分析——基于利益相关者视角  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis on Green Technological Innovation of Enterprises under the Environmental Regulations——Based on the View of Stakeholder

作　　者：曹霞[1] 张路蓬[2] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]清华大学公共管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第2期103-108,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71473055);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(14YJA630002);中央高校基本科研业务经费支持计划项目(HEUCFZ1604);黑龙江省哲学社科基金青年项目(16GLC05)

摘　　要：随着环境污染问题的日趋严重,政府与公众消费者对于企业绿色技术创新的要求不断加深,监督力度也随之加强。通过利益相关者的利益、权利分析,构建了政府、企业与消费者之间的三方演化博弈模型。通过仿真分析表明:政府公众环保宣传、创新激励以及污染税费征收对企业绿色技术创新均有促进作用;高强度污染税收、低强度公众环保宣传与适度的创新激励补偿对企业绿色技术创新的促进效果最为明显。As the environmental pollution problem becomes increasingly serious,new demands from the government and public consumers for green technological innovation of enterprises are continuously growing and along with that,the supervision is also strengthened.On the basis of analyzing the profit and rights of stakeholders,the tripartite evolutionary game model about the government,enterprises and consumers is built.According to the simulation analysis,some measures taken by the government can promote the green technological innovation of enterprises such as publicity of environmental protection,innovation incentive and collection of environmental pollution tax.It is the most significantly effective in motivating the green technological innovation of enterprises to collect high tax,publicize environment protection with low intensity and properly motivate compensation for innovation.

关 键 词：环境规制 绿色技术创新 利益相关者 演化博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F273