地方政府政绩诉求、“官员型”高管安插与政企关系动态调整——基于企业异地并购的调节作用  

Political achievement demands of local government,“official type” executives placement and the dynamic adjustment of government-enterprise connection:based on the moderating effects of inter-provincial M&A

作　　者：孙自愿[1] 许若琪 SUN Ziyuan XU Ruoqi(School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China The Finance Department, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]中国矿业大学财务资产部,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2017年第4期104-114,共11页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(12BGL044);国家社科基金重大项目(1&ZD163);江苏省教育科学"十三五"规划课题(D/2016/01/76)

摘　　要：以2008—2014年发生异地并购事件的企业为样本,实证检验地方政府基于经济、政治和社会管理三方面诉求,如何干预企业的人事结构安排以及如何主导政企关系的动态调整,并综合考虑企业异地并购行为对三者关系的调节作用。研究发现:(1)经济和政治诉求是政府干预企业内部人结构安排的主要动机,企业可通过异地并购有效避免官员基于个人政治晋升动机与企业内部同源代理人建立政治联系;(2)"官员型"高管比例越大,政企关系越为密切;当面临较小的政治晋升压力时,政府会放宽对企业的收益分配权,疏远与企业直接的政企关系,且这种调整不会受企业异地并购行为的影响,但会选择通过安插"官员型"高管,达到掌控企业的目的;(3)"官员型"高管是拉近政府与企业关系的桥梁,但此种密切的政企关系会损害企业经营效率;企业可以通过异地并购方式,逃避政府掠夺,规避政企关系给企业带来的抑制效应。Based on the MA samples during 2008—2014,this paper empirically studies how the local government intervenes enterprises＇ personnel structure arrangement and dominate the dynamic adjustment of government-enterprise connection,motivated by economic,political,and social management considerations. Besides,this paper also takes the moderating effects of inter-province mergers into consideration. The results show that：（ 1） It is mainly the economic and political motivations that make the government intervene personnel structure arrangement of enterprises,and enterprises can effectively avoid the government to establish political connections with its homologous agents through inter-provincial MA,while the government officials are aimed to ensure personal political promotion through political connections with insiders of enterprises.（ 2） The greater the proportion of ＂official type＂executives,the closer the relationship between government and enterprises. When faced with smaller political promotion pressure,the government will relax the distribution of enterprise income and alienate the direct relationship between government and enterprises,and this adjustment is not affected by the inter-provincial MA. But the government tends to monitor the enterprises through＂official type＂executives placement.（ 3） The＂official type＂executives are the bridge between the government and the enterprises,but this close relationship will damage the management efficiency of enterprises. However,enterprises could escape the government plunder and the suppression effect of political connection through inter-provincial MA.

关 键 词：政绩诉求 “官员型”高管 同源代理人 政企关系 动态调整 异地并购 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]