代理成本、弹性信息披露对审计收费的影响  

The Impacts of Agency Cost,Flexible Disclosure on Audit Fee

作　　者：朱春艳 伍利娜[2] 田利辉[3] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融发展研究院/南开大学商学院,300071 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,100871 [3]南开大学金融发展研究院,300071

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第7期89-95,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302015)的成果之一

摘　　要：本文研究了大股东与中小股东间的代理成本及弹性信息披露对审计收费的影响。我们发现上市公司不存在两权分离的情况下,大股东持股比例较低时,大股东持股比例与审计收费负相关;大股东持股比例较高时,大股东持股比例与审计收费正相关;两权分离程度较低的情况下,大股东持股比例较低时,大股东持股比例与审计收费负相关;两权分离程度较高的情况下,大股东持股比例较高时,大股东持股比例与审计收费负相关。上市公司弹性信息披露程度越高,审计收费越低;两权分离的存在会削弱弹性信息披露程度与审计收费之间的负相关关系。We discuss the impacts of proportion of the largest shareholder,separation of ownership and control,flexible disclosure in annual reports on audit fee in this paper.We find that when there is no separation of ownership and control,proportion of the largest shareholder and audit fee pictures a first negative and then positive curve.When separation of ownership and control is low,the proportion of the largest shareholder has a negative impact on audit fee when it is small;when separation of ownership and control is high,the proportion of the largest shareholder has a negative impact on audit fee when it is big.Besides that,we find that flexible disclosure will decrease audit risk and audit fee,and the influence is stronger when there is no separation of ownership and control of the largest shareholder.

关 键 词：两权分离 第一大股东持股比例 弹性信息披露 审计收费 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F275[经济管理—国民经济]