意向性是否实在  

Is the Intentionality Real

作　　者：季士强[1] JI Shi - qiang(School of Marxism, Guangdong Mechanical ＆ Electrical College, Guangzhou 510515, China)

机构地区：[1]广东机电职业技术学院马克思主义学院,广州510515

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2017年第4期31-35,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：广东省高校思政研究会课题(2015SZY038);国家社科基金项目(10BZX020)

摘　　要：意向性研究在当代哲学界方兴未艾,影响深远。但是对于意向性是否实在的问题,至今仍然争议颇多。斯蒂奇和丹尼特等人从意向并不实在的立场出发,提出意向性的取消论和工具论。与之相对,福多从意向具有因果力的观点出发,约翰·塞尔用"意向因果性"的概念,为意向实在论做出辩护。需指出,对于意向实在性的争论,重要的不是论证意向"由什么构成",而是它"能够干什么"。这种功能主义的论证也体现出意向性研究从语言分析向行动分析转变的实践性转向。Intentionality is ascendant and influential in modem philosophy. However, there still are lots of debates about the problem of whether intentionality is real. S. Stich and D. Dennett proceed from the stance of non-real intentionality to propose the eliminativism and instrumentalism of intentionality. On the contrary, J. Fodor holds that intention has causal power, and John Searle employs the concept of intentional causation to defend for the reality of intention. It is necessary to point out that what is important is what intentionality can do rather than what it is made of. This functionalism argument also embodies the practical transition of the intentionality research, which comes from Key linguistic analysis to the action analysis.

关 键 词：意向性 非实在论 实在论 意向因果性 功能主义 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]