代理成本、半强制分红与公司价值——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据  

Agency costs,semi mandatory dividends and firm value——Empirical evidence from China's A-share listed companies A

作　　者：胡耀亭[1] 马宏[2] HU Yao-ting MA Hong(Shenzhen stock exchange, Shenzhen Guangdong 518038, China School of economies, South- Central University For Nationalities ,Wuhan Hubei 430074, China)

机构地区：[1]深圳证券交易所,广东深圳518038 [2]中南民族大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2017年第4期76-83,共8页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"社会资本对我国金融发展与收入分配关系的调节效应研究"(12CJY014)

摘　　要：以2009—2015年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了半强制分红政策实施以后上市公司治理机制与代理成本的差异对现金股利和公司价值之间关系的影响。研究发现:(1)代理成本的差异会影响现金股利与公司价值的关系,如果公司存在良好治理机制来降低代理成本,其现金股利对公司价值的提升作用会大大下降。(2)上市公司主动发放的现金股利与公司价值呈显著正相关关系,但被动发放的现金股利与公司市场价值的相关性不强。from 2009 to 2015 two city Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as a sample, to test the effect of semi mandatory divi- dend policy after the implementation of corporate governance and agency cost differences on the relationship between cash dividend and company value. The study found that： （ 1 ） the difference of agency costs will affect the relationship between the cash dividend and the value of the company, if the company has good governance mechanism to reduce agency cost, the cash dividend to enhance the value of the company will be greatly reduced. （2） cash dividends issued by listed com- panies are positively related to corporate value, but passive cash dividends do not have a strong correlation with corporate market value.

关 键 词：代理成本 半强制分红政策 股权结构 公司价值 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学] F830.9