过度自信、补偿性契约与生鲜电商三边道德风险规制研究  

Study on the Trilateral Moral Hazard of Fresh E-commerce and Regulations Based on Overconfidence and Compensatory Contract

作　　者：吴士健[1] 孙向彦 刘新民[1] WU Shi-jian SUN Xiang-yan LIU Xin-min(College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, Chin)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2017年第7期29-36,62,共9页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"多任务委托代理关系下国企高管行为策略选择及优化研究"(71371111);山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目"上市公司经理权力影响效应及其治理机制研究"(BS2013SF019);山东科技大学科研创新团队支持计划(2015TDJH103)

摘　　要：基于生鲜电商运营决策中的复杂性和过度乐观倾向,文章将过度自信引入到电商、农户和产地经纪人的三边道德风险分析框架,分析了电商企业过度自信水平对各方收益的影响及对电商、产地经纪人和农户道德风险的影响机理,探讨了补偿性契约设计对三边道德风险的规制作用。研究发现,电商企业的过度自信对契约结构具有双重作用,一方面可以增加农户收益水平,降低农户的违规程度;另一方面也降低了产地经纪人的努力水平,增加了代理成本。补偿性契约设计可以有效规避三边道德风险,不仅可以减少电商企业的道德风险;同时,也有助于缓解产地经纪人的道德风险,降低农户的违规程度。Based on the complexity and excessive optimism in the decision-making of fresh e-commerce,the article introduces overconfidence to the trilateral moral hazard analysis framework of e-commerce,farmers and origin agents,analyzes the impacts of the overconfidence level of e-commerce on the payoffs,and on the moral hazard of e-commerce,farmers and origin agents,and discusses the regulatory role of compensatory contract design on the trilateral moral hazard. Results show that the overconfidence of the e-businesses has a dual role on the contract structure. On the one hand,it can increase farmers＇ income while decreasing the farmers＇ violation of rules; on the other hand,it can save the efforts of origin agents while increasing the agency costs. Compensatory contract design can effectively avoid the trilateral moral hazard. It lowers the moral hazard of e-businesses and of the origin agents,and decreases the farmers＇ violation of rules at the same time.

关 键 词：过度自信 补偿性契约 代理成本 三边道德风险 生鲜电商 

分 类 号：F724[经济管理—产业经济]