“农户——农产品加工中心”二级供应链激励契约研究——基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈模型  

Research on Incentive Contract of Tow- Stage Supply Chain of Farmers and Agricultural Products Processing Center——Based on Rubinstein Bargaining Model

作　　者：梁雯[1] 陈广强[1] 袁帅石 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,合肥230601 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第2期74-84,共11页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(15BJY117);安徽省教育厅人文社科重点项目(SK2015A241)

摘　　要：基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈模型,针对农户与农产品加工中心就农产品加工后带来的共同利益的分配问题,建立并求解无限期Rubinstein轮流出价的讨价还价博弈,并根据破裂点考虑农产品加工中心的机会主义支付,最后得到农户与农产品加工中心利益分配的均衡契约。Based on Rubinstein bargaining model, aiming at the distribution of common interests for farmers and agricultural products processing center for agricultural products after processing, the paper established and solved indefinitely Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game, while opportunism payment of the agricultural product processing center is analyzed under breakdown point, finally getting the equilibrium contract of ben- efits allocation for farmers and agricultural products processing center. The equilibrium contract shows that farmers and agricultural products process- ing center are entitled to a part of the future of common interests, and takes into account the interests of the agricultural products processing center under the protection of the interests of farmers. The whole interests of two - stage supply chain of farmers and agricultural products processing cen- ter, the effort of agricultural products processing center, and the interests of agricultural products processing center are related in the equilibrium contract, which explains the equilibrium contract not only balanced but also efficient, and the equilibrium contract can provide a more realistic ref- erence to the design of incentive contract of ＂farmers--agricultural products processing center＂ two - stage supply chain.

关 键 词：Rubinstein讨价还价模型 逆向归纳法 均衡契约 激励契约 破裂风险 

分 类 号：F259[经济管理—国民经济]