考虑碳排放容忍度的多级供应链生产-库存系统碳税博弈策略  

The carbon tax game strategy for multi-level supply chain production inventory system considering the tolerance of carbon emissions

作　　者：戢守峰[1] 蓝海燕[1,2] 孙琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110169 [2]辽宁工业大学管理学院,锦州121001

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年第8期2071-2082,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71572031);辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目(L16AZY032)~~

摘　　要：为解决多级供应链不同主体间应对碳限制与碳税机制问题,基于Stackelberg博弈理论研究了由单制造商、多分销商和多零售商构成的多级供应链生产-库存系统碳税博弈策略.针对政府对于企业超标准排放的容忍程度,设定了级差等级碳税,并据此建立了多级供应链生产-库存系统策略集合;对比级差碳税与统一碳税下四种博弈策略的成本及碳排放水平变化,给出了制造商和零售商主导下的非合作博弈模型以及供应链成员间合作博弈模型,并进行了分析.数值算例验证了模型和算法的有效性.In order to solve the problems of carbon limitation and carbon tax mechanism on the multi-level supply chain between different departments, the model in the paper, which consists of one manufacturer, multi-distributor and multi-retaileL was built based on Stackelberg game theory. Because of the tolerance of carbon over-emissions from the enterprises, the paper studied the differential policies which contain carbon tax and the production-inventory systems. Comparing different environment about differential carbon tax and harmonized carbon tax, the paper presents and analyzes four game strategies about cost and carbon emission levels, and the non-cooperative game model under the guidance of the manufacturer and the retailer, and the cooperative game model between departments of the supply chain. The effectiveness of the model and algorithm were testified through the numerical example.

关 键 词：碳排放容忍度 级差碳税 统一碳税 合作与非合作博弈模型 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]