研发联盟中专项投资对自身知识被侵占风险的影响研究  

Empirical Study on the Effects of a Firm's Specific Asset Investments on Its Knowledge Appropriation Risk in R&D Alliance

作　　者：王龙伟[1] 陈婉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2017年第8期97-108,共12页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472145)

摘　　要：专项投资是研发联盟中实现资源互补必不可少的部分。基于交易成本理论和社会交换理论,分析了研发联盟背景下企业专项投资对自身知识被侵占风险的影响,以及企业监督和善意信任对专项投资与知识被侵占风险之间关系的调节作用。通过对155家参与合作创新的制造业企业发放问卷来收集样本,采用多元统计分析方法对假设进行验证。结果表明:(1)企业专项投资与其知识被侵占风险之间存在正相关关系;(2)监督削弱了企业专项投资与其知识被侵占风险之间的正向关系;(3)善意信任会对"专项投资—知识被侵占风险"关系产生U型调节作用:即适度的善意信任会降低企业专项投资带来的知识被侵占风险,而过低或过高的善意信任都会放大专项投资带来的知识被侵占风险。Special asset investment is a crucial element to achieve mutual complementation of resources in R＆D alliance. Based on the Transaction Cost Theory and the Social Exchange Theory, the relationship between specific asset investments and the knowledge appropriation risk under the background of R＆D alliance, and the moderating effects of monitoring and goodwill trust are analyzed. By survey of 155 manufactures with more innovation be- haviors and collecting the research samples, moderated regression model is used to test the hypotheses proposed. This results suggest that （1） Finn＇s specific investments be positively related to its knowledge appropriation; （2） Monitoring weaken the positive relationship between specific investments and knowledge appropriation; （3） The effect of specific investments on knowledge appropriation be least at a moderate level of goodwill trust, so that the relationship between specific investments and knowledge appropriation across low and high levels of goodwill trust is represented by an U-shape.

关 键 词：专项投资 知识被侵占风险 基于合同的监督 善意信任 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学] F273.1