PPP模式中不同理性人视角下激励监督机制研究  

Research on Incentive and Supervision Mechanism Based on Different Rational Perspectives for PPP Model

作　　者：陈通[1] 全志才 CHEN Tong QUAN Zhicai(School of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2017年第4期453-458,共6页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272148)

摘　　要：有效的激励措施和监督机制对于PPP模式的成功必不可少。从政府监督角度出发,通过建立自利人假设的委托代理模型和公平偏好假设的委托代理模型,解析收益分享系数、公平偏好因子、政府监督积极性、政府监督力度对企业努力水平的影响,同时比较自利人假设模型与公平偏好假设模型下政府的监督成本、期望收益及企业最优努力水平的变化。发现自利人假设模型下企业最优努力水平大于或等于公平偏好假设模型下的企业最优努力水平,且公平偏好假设模型下政府的期望收益将小于自利人假设模型下政府的期望收益,公平偏好假设模型下政府的监督成本将大于自利人假设模型下政府的监督成本。Effective incentives and monitoring mechanisms are essential for the PPP model＇s success. From the perspective of government supervision,through establishing self-interested people assume agency model and fairness preference assumptions principal-agent model,this article analyzes the impactions of venue sharing coefficient,fairness preference factor,government incentives for corporate effort level,and comparing the changes of government＇s monitoring cost,government＇s revenue expecting and optimal effort level of private enterprise. It＇s found that optimal effort level of self-interested people assume agency model is greater or equal to this of fairness preference assumptions principal-agent model and the expected revenue of the government of fairness preference assumptions principal-agent model will be less than the government expects revenue of self-interested people assume agency model,and governments monitoring costs of fairness preference assumptions principal-agent model will be more than government supervision cost of self-interested people assume agency model.

关 键 词：PPP模式 激励 监督 自利人假设 公平偏好假设 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]