政府信息服务合同外包激励机制研究——基于公众评价视角  

Government Information Services Outsourcing Contract Incentive Mechanism:from the Public Evaluation Perspective

作　　者：万晓榆[1] 龙宇[1] 蒋婷[1] Wan Xiaoyu Long Yu Jiang Ting(Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 40006)

机构地区：[1]重庆邮电大学,重庆400065

出　　处：《情报杂志》2017年第8期202-206,F0003,共6页Journal of Intelligence

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目"新兴信息消费的环境评估及治理研究"(编号:15XGL024);重庆市社会科学规划一般项目"重庆市新兴信息消费的环境评估及治理研究"(编号:2015YBGL111)研究成果之一

摘　　要：[目的/意义]合同外包被视为提高政府信息服务水平、节约服务成本的重要手段,而解决外包过程中由信息不对称而导致的服务商道德风险问题是保证信息服务水平的根本前提。[方法/过程]从公众评价作为主观绩效来影响服务商收益的角度出发,运用委托-代理理论构建了公众参与下的激励-监督模型,并对模型进行求解和结果分析。[结果/结论]引入公众评价后,政府对服务商的监督水平升高,收益共享系数降低,服务商努力水平变高;公众对信息服务水平的评价表现为一种内在的激励约束机制,可作为引导服务商提高信息服务水平的重要手段。[ Purpose/Significance ] Outsourcing contract is regarded as an important measure for improving government information service and saving service cost. Solving the problem of service provider＇s moral hazard caused by information asymmetry in the outsourcing process is the basic premise to ensure the level of information service. [ Method/Process] From the impact of the public evaluation as the subjective performance on the service providers＇ gains, this paper uses the principal-agent theory to construct the ineantive-supervision model of the public participation. Then the model is solved and the results are analyzed. [ Result/Conclusion ] The results show that the service providers＇ level of effort rises and the revenue sharing coefficient and supervision level decreases after the introduction of public evaluation. The public＇s evaluation of information service quality follows an internal incentive and restrained mechanism, which can be used as an important measure to guide the service providers to improve their information service.

关 键 词：信息服务 合同外包 委托-代理 公众评价 激励监督 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]