城际运输通道客票定价博弈研究  

Research on Pricing Game of Inter-city Transportation Corridors

作　　者：梁喜[1] 姚锦云[2] LIANG Xil YAO Jin-yun(School of Economics ＆ Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China School ofTraffic ＆ Transportation,Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆市400074 [2]重庆交通大学交通运输学院,重庆市400074

出　　处：《公路》2017年第8期161-166,共6页Highway

摘　　要：伴随着城际高铁的规划建设与投入运营,运输通道内的城际客运交通市场竞争愈演愈烈。其中在中短途运输中,城际高铁和高速大巴竞争最为激烈。在分析旅客出行影响因素的基础上,使用Logit模型描述运输通道内不同交通方式的分担率,进而建立城际高铁和高速大巴运营公司的利润函数模型,再以票价作为竞争策略变量,建立城际高铁公司和高速大巴公司的双矩阵博弈模型。最后以昌九运输通道为例,求解纳什均衡点,即最佳票价组合,此时城际高铁公司和高速大巴公司都实现其企业利润最大化,没有任何一方能通过调整策略而增加自身的利润。Accompanied by construction and operation of inter-city high-speed railway, the competition of inter-city passenger transport market is intensely. In the transport of short and medium distance, inter-city high-speed railway and high-speed bus are most competitive. Based on the analysis on the influence factor of passenger travel, in this paper the Logit model is used to describe the proportion ofdifferent means of transportation of the channel, establishing the profit function model of inter-city high- speed railway and high-speed bus, then the ticket price as competitive strategy variables, the double matrix game models for inter-city high-speed railway and high-speed bus company are established. Finally the Nanchang-Jiujiang corridor is taken for example, the Nash equilibrium is calculated, namely the best fare combination. At this moment the inter-city high-speed railway and high-speed bus companies can maximize their profits, and no one can increase their own profits through adjusting fare strategy.

关 键 词：交通运输经济 城际运输通道 双矩阵博弈模型 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F503[经济管理—产业经济]