林权抵押、信贷约束与林农信贷可得性——基于一个静态博弈模型的分析  

Forest Right Mortgage,Credit Constraint and Farmers' Credit Availability:Based on a Static Game Model

作　　者：金银亮[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,南京210037 [2]南京师范大学泰州学院,江苏泰州225300

出　　处：《林业经济问题》2017年第3期51-54,共4页Issues of Forestry Economics

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究课题(2015SJB106)

摘　　要：通过设计博弈模型,讨论了单期博弈下的信贷约束、在假设条件下的动态及重复博弈分析以及林权抵押改善信贷约束。首先确定信贷存在利率约束,为了降低信贷风险,对林农等信贷需求者采取信贷约束措施;在动态和重复博弈中,银行和林农之间的均衡策略为合作,也即银行放贷,林农还贷;通过抵押担保模型发现,森林资源可以降低银行的预期贴现。因此,提出继续确定林权抵押政策的确切内涵、增强团体贷款能力、政府分担银行部分信贷风险等相关建议对策。⑴Background——Forest right mortgage is an important measure to enhance the level of forestry management,promote the efficiency of forestry management and increase the income of farmers.As a small-scale farmers,the credit transmission mechanism is not perfect,the risk of forestry management is high,so the credit constraint which simply using the forest resources as the mortgage is difficult to improve.And most banks have set up stringent conditions on forest mortgages,thus common farmers still obtain loans difficultly.⑵Methods——Assuming that the participated subjective is rational,the information is complete,the obtaining process has no cost and the delivery procedure is full and correct,thus the objective function of bank consider the security of the loan in order to maximize the benefits.The income function of forest farmers is to obtain loans.If the assumed conditions meet the requirements,the game could be balanced(lending,repayment).In the single-stage game model,banks can not raise interest rates to obtain high returns.Therefore,banks are forced to develop a lower level of the interest rate and select the forest farmers with better credit in order to encourage them to invest the loans into forestry.In the dynamic and repeated game,the speed and quality of information transmission has been further enhanced,banks and farmers will form a long-term cooperative relationship.⑶Results——Banks and other financial institutions put limitations on forest farmers loans in order to reduce their own business risks.If without interest rate control,banks can not refuse forest farmers(low credit level)to apply loans by increasing interest rates.So this practice would enhance the reverse selection and moral hazard.Forest resources can be used as collateral,which could improve the information transmission mechanism and credibility of forest farmers,reduce the level of credit constraints,but it must be built on the corresponding policies issued by government and other institutions.The effect would not be obvious

关 键 词：林权抵押 信贷约束 信贷可得性 

分 类 号：F326.23[经济管理—产业经济]