地区腐败与企业盈余管理方式选择  

Regional Corruption and the Selection of Corporate Earnings Management Styles

作　　者：张玮倩[1,2] 方军雄[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2017年第9期115-124,共10页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072003);第59批中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2016M591607)

摘　　要：通过手工搜集2003—2014年我国各省份腐败案件的立案数据,考察了地区腐败对企业日常管理活动的影响,发现地区腐败越严重,该地区企业的盈余管理水平就越高,且相较于应计制盈余管理,腐败严重地区的企业更可能选择真实活动盈余管理方式,这在业绩较差和业绩不及预期的企业中表现得更为明显。这一结果为研究政府官员腐败如何影响企业日常管理活动提供了证据,厘清了腐败影响盈余管理的方式,也为政府部门监管提供了政策启示。This paper investigates the influence of regional corruption on corporate behavior from the perspective of earnings management. Relying on provincial-level corruption data in China from 2003 to 2014, we find regional corruption has a significantly positive relationship with earnings management level. Moreover, it also has a significantly positive relationship with real earnings man- agement, but irrelevant to accrual earnings management. That means, listed companies＇ activities are influenced by regional corrup- tion, especially for the decision in choosing earnings management styles. In addition, we find regional corruption has a stronger rela- tionship with real earnings management in firms with lower ROA and those with weaker performance than their expectations. The re- sults make sense on corporate day-to-day management activities and government regulation.

关 键 词：地区腐败 真实活动盈余管理 应计制盈余管理 企业业绩 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]