破产案件检察监督新构造  

The New Construction of Prosecutorial Supervision for Bankruptcy Cases

作　　者：梁伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学法学院,长春130012

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2017年第3期29-37,共9页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金项目"我国破产案件中劳动债权问题研究"(12BF116);吉林大学重大培育项目"破产法的功能与局限--一个现实主义视角的探索"(2016ZDPY09)

摘　　要：检察权介入破产程序履行监督职责具有法理维度、规范维度和利益平衡维度的多重正当性,但破产案件中法官角色的转换、尊重当事人处分和辩论主义,以及破产法功能适用的弱化造成检察监督不力的现状。检察监督的介入应符合成本收益原则,在利益博弈之上进行居中调和,改变惯性的监督思维,转为支持与监督并重路径,并划定检察权行使的界域,保障审判权的独立行使,促进公共利益的最优实现。Prosecutorial power intervention in bankruptcy procedure supervision responsibility has legitimacy of legal dimension, normative dimension and interests balance dimension. However, the transformation of the role of judges in the bankruptcy proceedings, the respect of the parties and the compression of the function caused the incompetence of prosecutorial supervision. The prosecutorial supervision intervention should conform to the cost-benefit principle,reconcile the interests of the game centered on the change of the inertia of thinking mode,attach importance to support and supervision,define the prosecutorial power boundary,safeguard judicial authority and realize the public interests.

关 键 词：破产案件 检察权 支持监督 利益调和 

分 类 号：D926.3[政治法律—法学]