我国收入初次分配的市场结构困境及对策  被引量:2

Dilemma and Countermeasures of Initial Distribution of China's Income

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作  者:王柏玲[1] 李慧[1] 

机构地区:[1]大连海事大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116026

出  处:《税务与经济》2017年第5期1-9,共9页Taxation and Economy

基  金:辽宁省社科基金项目"新常态下经济增长动力研究"(项目编号:L16BJY004)阶段性研究成果

摘  要:收入初次分配问题是当前理论和实践中的难点问题,它直接影响着一个国家对公平效率悖论的解决方式,每个国家都在努力探索中前行。作为我国收入分配基本原则的"按劳分配",体现着一个社会对劳动者的尊重和依赖;而"按要素贡献分配"则是市场经济国家解决收入分配问题的通行规则。随着我国社会主义市场经济的建设和深入发展,两种收入分配机制被日益统一在一起,指导着我国要素所有者的初次分配。但这两种收入分配准则的有效运行都需要通过充分竞争的市场才能实现。现实中的产品市场和要素市场都是不完全竞争的市场结构,必然存在各方的利益博弈和冲突,意味着理论上有效的收入分配准则失去了现实的依托,必须通过社会建设、再分配以及其他创新性政策加以应对和弥补。The Initial distribution is a difficult problem in theory and practice. It directly affects the solution to the paradox of fairness and efficiency in any country and every country is putting great effort to grope for it. As the basic principle of income distribution in China,"distribution according to one' s performance"demonstrates that the society has respect for the labors and depends on them. On the contrary,"distribution according to factor contribution"is the common rule adopted by the countries of market economy to solve the problem of income distribution. With the construction and deepening development of the socialist market economy,these two distribution mechanisms are increasingly unified to guide the initial distribution of the element owners in China. But,the effective operation of these two principles is achieved through a fully competitive market. The structures of both product market and the factor market are not fully competitive,and there must be benefit game and conflict between parties,which means the effective income distribution principles have lost the practical support. Therefore,it is necessary to solve this problem and make up loss through social construction,redistribution and other innovative policies.

关 键 词:收入分配 按劳分配 按要素贡献分配 

分 类 号:F046[经济管理—政治经济学]

 

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