审计费用信息隐藏与审计质量——基于审计独立性和投资者感知视角的研究  

Non-Disclosure of Audit Fees and Audit Quality——Evidence from Auditor Independence and Perceived Audit Quality

作　　者：张俊生[1,2] 汤晓建[1,2] 曾亚敏[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,510275 [2]暨南大学管理学院,510632

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第8期88-93,共6页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71672205;71302014;71772079;71332004);教育部人文社科研究基金(15YJC630171)的资助

摘　　要：根据证监会的规定,上市公司应当在年度报告中披露支付给会计师事务所的报酬。然而,我国每年仍有一定数量的公司没有按照规定披露审计费用。为此,本文从审计独立性和投资者感知审计质量两个视角分析审计收费信息隐藏情境下的审计质量。研究发现:(1)如果上市公司不披露审计费用信息,那么会弱化可控应计与非标审计意见之间的正向关系,这意味着不披露审计费用可能会有损审计独立性;(2)不披露审计费用的公司所披露的超预期盈余的盈余反应系数较低,即投资者对这类公司的感知审计质量较低。The CRSC requires the listed companies to disclose audit fees in their annual financial reports,but there are still some companies do not disclose the information of audit fees.Therefore,this paper examines the relation between non-disclosure of audit fees and audit quality.The results show that when firms have low earnings quality,non-disclosure of audit fees help firms to acquire clear audit opinion from auditors,which indicates that audit opinion shopping may happen.Moreover,although CRSC does to penalize these firms,investors still consider non-disclosure of audit fees as a negative behavior in the stock market.Specially,investors would cast a strong doubt on the reliability of earnings surprise on earnings announcement.

关 键 词：审计费用 审计意见购买 审计质量 审计独立性 盈余反应系数 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]