上游补贴利益传递:经济学分析与法律规制——基于价格弹性理论的视角  

Benefit Pass-through of Upstream Subsidies: Economic Analysis and Legal Measures: Based on the theory of Price Elasticity

作　　者：李仲平[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院法学院

出　　处：《国际商务研究》2017年第5期47-54,共8页International Business Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"WTO补贴规则与中国产业补贴政策的变革研究"(项目编号:12BFX139);广东金融学院"创新强校工程"项目"‘网络强国战略’背景下中国补贴网络产业的法律困境与对策研究"

摘　　要：价格弹性理论的分析表明,政府旨在消除国内生产商劣势的补贴通常不发生利益传递,而政府超额补贴必然引发利益传递,并且利益传递程度与投入产品的需求价格弹性呈反比关系。鉴于正向追踪投入产品的需求价格弹性不具有可操作性,上游补贴利益传递程度的量化应逆向回溯投入产品的市场价格。而在此类价格不存在或不合理时,无需构建调整价格,因为外部基准是相对客观、中立的选择。此外,利益传递应仅向上游追溯一个环节,并以投入产品的补贴数量为上限。The analysis of price elasticity theory shows final goods do not always gain benefit from input products subsidies. Only when subsidies amount more than offsetting the recipient of competitive disadvantage, will benefit be passed and price elasticity of demand and benefit transfer effect is inversely proportional relationship. Given the positive track the demand price elasticity of input is not operable,identifying and quantifying the benefit pass- through of upstream subsidies reverse the market price of input constitutes.When such market price of subsiding country does not exist or is not reasonable,there is no need to build the adjusted pricebut external benchmark is relatively objective and neutral benchmark price; especially the degree of upper limit on pass-through is the number of input subsidies and the benefit of pass-through analysis should only back a link to upstream.

关 键 词：上游补贴 利益传递 价格弹性 

分 类 号：F714[经济管理—产业经济]