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机构地区:[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061
出 处:《经济经纬》2017年第5期27-31,共5页Economic Survey
基 金:陕西省社会科学基金项目(2016D013)
摘 要:非税收入是地方政府扶持地方经济发展的重要财政竞争工具。基于空间计量模型,运用中国2004—2012年非税收入、非税收入竞争和环境污染的省级面板数据,对地方政府之间非税收入竞争行为及其对环境污染影响进行定性和定量研究。研究发现:第一,中国省级政府之间均采取了相互模仿的非税收入竞争行为;第二,省级政府非税收入竞争与环境污染具体关系表现为本省环境污染程度与本省非税收入负担率成反比,与邻省非税收入负担率也成反比;第三,省级政府非税收入竞争对环境污染的影响,呈现出"趋劣竞争"的特性。本文研究结果从非税收入角度为"清费立税"和开征环境税提供理论和实证支持。Non-tax revenue is one of the important tools of the fiscal competition among the local governments to promote economic development. Based on spatial econometric model and provincial panel data for China from 2004 to 2012,this paper carries out a quantitative and qualitative study of non-tax revenue competition among local governments and their impacts on environmental pollution. The results reveal that: first,the provincial governments take the strategies of mutual imitation on non-tax revenue competition; second,the level of environmental pollution in a province is in inverse proportion to the non-tax revenue burden rate in the province and that in the adjacent province; third,the effects of provincial governments' non-tax revenue competition on environmental pollution show the characteristic of "Race to the Bottom". These findings,theoretically and empirically,support the view of "Purging Fees and Establishing Taxes"as well as the necessity of imposing environmental tax from the perspective of non-tax revenue competition.
分 类 号:F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学]
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