基于公平偏好的工程总承包委托代理分析  

Principal-agent Analysis of EPC Incorporating Fairness Preference

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 曾静[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2017年第16期81-89,共9页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：重庆市高等学校优秀人才支持计划项目(渝教人[2010]72号)

摘　　要：针对工程总承包中总承包商和分包商之间的双边道德风险问题,把公平偏好引入委托代理模型,研究总承包商对分包商的激励机制,分析公平偏好的影响效应.研究发现:公平偏好是决定产出分享系数和固定价格的重要因素,并会改变风险规避、努力贡献等对产出分享系数和努力水平等的影响,而风险规避和努力贡献也会改变公平偏好对产出共享系数和努力水平等的影响,三者之间具有交互影响效应.因此,总承包商应该充分考虑分包商的风险规避、公平偏好和努力贡献等三种属性,忽略其中任何一种因素都是不合理的.Aiming at the problem of double moral hazard between the general contractor and the subcontractor in engineering procurement construction, the fairness preference is incorpo- rated into the classical principal agent model to design the mechanism for the general contractor to urge the subcontractor, and hereby the influence of the fairness preference is analyzed. It is found that the fairness preference is an important factor deciding the coefficient of output dis- tribution, will change the effect of the risk aversion and the effort contribution on the coefficient of output distribution, while the risk aversion and the effort contribution also change the effect of the fairness preference on the coefficient of output distribution. Therefore, they are influ- enced mutually. Consequently, the general contractor should carefully the fairness preference, the risk aversion and the effort contribution of the subcontractor when designing mechanism. It is unreasonable to ignore anyone of these factors.

关 键 词：工程总承包 公平偏好 委托代理 机制设计 

分 类 号：F426.92[经济管理—产业经济]