氮氧化物减排博弈行为研究  

Research of the Game Behavior of Emission Reduction of Nitrogen Oxides

作　　者：黄少薇[1] 张骥骧[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106

出　　处：《环境保护科学》2017年第4期55-61,共7页Environmental Protection Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71101071);中国博士后科学基金(2013M530089);南航大基本科研业务费科研项目(NR2015025)基金资助

摘　　要：针对我国氮氧化物减排的严峻形势,文章借鉴瑞典氮氧化物减排的税收返还制度,运用进化博弈的理论和方法,建立了政府与企业关于氮氧化物减排的进化博弈模型,并进行了求解分析。结果表明:策略(减排,税收返还制度)和策略(减排,标准减排制度)都可以是稳定均衡策略,即无论政府采取税收返还制度还是标准减排制度,只要对惩罚系数、税率等参数进行调整都能迫使企业进行氮氧化物减排。但通过模拟可知税收返还制度对企业的激励作用更大,可以促使企业长期持续的进行氮氧化物减排。In this paper, with regard to the severe situation of emission reduction of nitrogen oxides in China, by reference to the Swedish tax refund system, evolutionary game theory and method is used to establish an evolutionary game model of emission reduction of nitrogen oxides between government and enterprise, and solution analysis is performed. The results show that the strategy（emission reduction, tax refund system） and the strategy（emission reduction, standard emission reduction system） are both stable equilibrium strategies. That is, whether the government takes tax refund system or standard emission reduction system, as long as the penalty coefficient, tax rate and other parameters can be adjusted, enterprises could be forced to reduce emission of nitrogen oxides. However, the simulation results indicate that the tax return system has a greater incentive to the enterprises, which can promote enterprises to reduce emission of nitrogen oxides for long.

关 键 词：税收返还制度 标准减排制度 氮氧化物减排 进化博弈 

分 类 号：X51[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]