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机构地区:[1]哈尔滨理工大学系统工程研究所,哈尔滨150080
出 处:《系统工程理论与实践》2017年第9期2355-2365,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基 金:国家自然科学基金(71171069;71301036)~~
摘 要:针对单个制造商和单个零售商构成的双渠道信息产品供应链系统,构建了需求扰动前后,以制造商为主导的双渠道信息产品供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了需求扰动前后,集中式和分散式双渠道信息产品供应链定价和决策。通过求解最优化问题的Karush-Kuhn-Tucker条件,发现需求扰动对信息产品供应链的影响。说明无需求扰动时,双渠道信息产品供应链的利润受市场规模的影响,且零售渠道弹性较强。需求扰动发生时,双渠道信息产品供应链的利润随着扰动单调变化;分散式信息产品供应链通过收益共享合约,制定批发价格能够有效地协调信息产品供应链。For dual-channel information goods supply chain system consisted of one-manufacturer and one- retailer, the model of manufacturer-dominated dual-channel information goods supply chain is developed based on the theory of Stackelberg game. The impact of demand disruptions on the optimal pricing and production decisions is analyzed in centralized and decentralized dual-channel information goods supply chain, respectively. By solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the optimization problem, the effect of demand disruptions on the information goods supply chain is found. Without demand disruptions, the profit of dual-channel information goods supply chain is affected by market size, and the retail channels are more flexible. With demand disruptions, the profit of dual-channel information goods supply chain varies monotonically with demand disruptions. The wholesale price set by revenue sharing contract could coordinate the information goods supply chain in decentralized information goods supply chain.
分 类 号:TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]
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