公益性PPP项目特许期与政府补贴机制设计  

The Concession Period and Government's Compensation Mechanism for Commonweal PPP Project

作　　者：王卓甫[1] 侯嫚嫚 丁继勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学工程管理研究所,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2017年第18期194-201,共8页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"建设工程项目交易模式创新路径与增值机理研究"(71402045)

摘　　要：特许期与政府补贴机制设计是公益性PPP项目能否得以顺利实施的关键所在。考虑私人方风险偏好,以私人方服务质量作为特许期与政府补偿的决策依据,建立了政府方与私人方之间的Stackelberg博弈模型。运用逆推归纳法,依据私人方在自身效益最大化下付出的努力水平,求出在满足净社会效益最大化时应设置的最优特许期与私人方努力绩效的分配比例,进而得出最优特许期限及政府支付给私人方的最优年补贴成本。最后,引入实际案例,运用matlab对数据进行分析,进一步揭示了政府对特许期与年补贴费用决策的一些反直觉特性,以期为公益性PPP项目的实施提供参考。The design of the concession period and the government subsidy mechanism is the key to the smooth implementation of the public welfare PPP project. This paper established Stackelberg game model between the government and the private party, considered the private party risk preference, and based on the private party service quality as the concession period and the government compensation to make the decision . Based on the level of effort paid by the private party under the maximization of its own benefit, this paper uses the inverse deduction method to find out the proportion of the optimal concession period and the private party＇s performance when the net social benefit is maximized. And then find the optimal concession period and the government＇s annual subsidy cost to the private party. Finally, it can further reveals some counter-intuitive characteristics of government＇s decision-making on concession and annual subsidy under the introduction of the actual case, the use of matlab data analysis, in order to providing reference for the implementation of public welfare PPP project.

关 键 词：公益性PPP项目 特许期 政府补贴 博弈 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济] F812.45