行政诉讼对街头官僚执法的监督功能:基于交警执法的个案研究  

The Supervision Function of Administrative Litigation on Street Bureaucratic Enforcement:A Case Study Based on Traffic Police Enforcement

作　　者：潘新美 何彬[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学政治与公共管理学院 [2]华侨大学MPA中心

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2017年第9期52-57,共6页Chinese Public Administration

摘　　要：诉讼作为一种问责街头官僚不当执法行为的监督方式是有效的,但这种监督方式受到诸多制约。行政相对人自身的法律意识和法律能力直接关系到能否掌握街头官僚的执法不当行为的信息,这是对街头官僚进行问责的关键。行政机关积极进行撤诉动员则是由于官僚体制内部的激励扭曲,现有的绩效考核制度不仅没有激励行政机关在败诉后改变自身行为,反而促使行政机关努力避免败诉,绩效考核指标设计及绩效考核的强激励是产生激励扭曲的根源。This paper discusses how the administrative litigation can play the role of supervising the street bureaucratic law enforcement. It is found that litigation is effective as a way of monitoring the behavior of street bureaucratic improper enforcement, but this kind of supervision is subject to many constraints. The legal consciousness and legal capacity of the administrative counterparts are directly related to the ability to grasp the information of street bureaucratic misconduct, which is the key to accountability for street bureaucrats. Furthermore, the reason to mobilize administrative sector to withdraw is actually the distortion of internal incentives in bureaucracy. Specifically, the existing incentives are not to change the behavior after losing but to urge the administrative sector to avoid losing. The performance evaluation indicators designing and the strong incentives of performance evaluation are the roots of incentive distortion.

关 键 词：诉讼 街头官僚 监督 激励扭曲 

分 类 号：D922.14[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学] D925.3[政治法律—法学]