论塞尔的社会哲学  

On Searle's Philosophy of Society

作　　者：柳海涛[1,2] LIU Hai - tao(School of Marxism, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China Research Center for Philosophy of Science and Technology in Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学马克思主义学院,重庆400044 [2]山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心,太原030006

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2017年第5期14-19,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金项目(1020607820150002);中国博士后科学基金项目(2015M570237);中央高校基本科研业务费资助(106112017CDJXY010013)

摘　　要：社会建构论往往把社会实在看成是语言的建构。塞尔对社会实在的论述以言语行为的游戏性操作为基础。他前后两个时期的社会建构论的基本思想是连贯的,新近的理论更加明确地主张制度事实的创造是一种地位功能的宣告,进而认为社会文明的结构是通过宣告式语言的逻辑操作建构起来的。过于依赖言语行为,以及彻底的生物学自然主义和方法论的个体主义,使塞尔的社会哲学遮蔽了语言操作背后的超语言行动,忽视了制度事实所蕴含的集体性因素。从集体主义出发,不依靠言语行为,制度事实则呈现出另一种特征。总的来说,基于自然主义的社会哲学缺乏对制度事实的双重性特征以及人与社会辩证关系的深刻把握。The core idea of Searle＇ s constructivism of social reality in two periods is coherent. New theories clearly advocated that the creation of institutional facts is the declaration of status function, and thus the social world is constructed by the logy -linguistic operation. Over- reliance on speech acts, as well as methodological individual- ism of Searle＇ s social constructivism underestimates the extra - language action behind the language operation and neglects the collective factors involved in institutional facts. From the point view of collectivism, it can also provide a more comprehensive explanation of institutional facts without relying on speech acts. At the same time, Searle＇ s social constructivism lacks some key factors,

关 键 词：制度事实 宣告 地位功能 集体接受 实践 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]