查尔莫斯的认知二维语义学及其引发的争论  

On Chalmers' Epistemic Two-dimensional Semantics and Debates It Has Triggered

作　　者：刘晓青[1] LIU Xiao - qing(Department of Philosophy, Party School of the Central Committee of the C. P. C. ,Beijing 100091, China)

机构地区：[1]中共中央党校哲学部,北京100091

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2017年第5期50-54,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学研究基金资助项目"认知科学对当代哲学的挑战:心灵与认知哲学重大理论问题研究"(11AZD120)

摘　　要：面对CP论题的合理性问题,查尔莫斯给出了修正的可想象性论证,在认知二维语义学的框架下重新解释了可想象性与可能性之间的关系,表现出一定的解释力。但作为一种尝试性解决方案,不可避免地遭到索姆斯和福布斯的批判,二人围绕描述主义、可能性、"嵌套"等相关问题与查尔莫斯展开了长期的争论,指出了一系列值得分析的问题。To illustrate the rationality of CP thesis, David J. Chalmers improves the traditional conceivability argument and rebuilds the bridge between conceivability and possibility under epistemic two -dimensional semantics. To some extent, the new solution is reasonable but disputable. Especially Scott Soames and Graeme Forbes attempt to make criticism to it. They argue over some related problems for a long time, including descriptivism, possibility and ＂nesting＂, which are still debatable issues.

关 键 词：CP论题 查尔莫斯 认知二维语义学 索姆斯 福布斯 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]