公共自行车利益主体博弈建模与分析  

Game Modeling and Analysis of Public Bicycle Stakeholder

作　　者：范丽 朱从坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州科技大学土木工程学院,苏州215011

出　　处：《城市公共交通》2017年第9期41-44,共4页Urban Public Transport

摘　　要：基于博弈理论,构建了公共自行车运营效益最大化模型,并对模型进行求解,分析了利益主体的控制权水平与努力水平对效益的影响。结果表明:各利益主体只有在最优控制权水平时,才能使总体效益达到最大化,企业的最优控制权与其产出系数成正比,各利益主体的努力水平应控制在合理范围内。Based on the game and solves tile model, analyz The results showed that all th efficiency, the optimal contro theory, this paper constructs the model of the maximum benefit of the public bicycle operation, es the influence of the control level and the effort level of the stakeholders on the benefits. e stakeholders only at the level of control in order to make the overall optimum, to maximizel and the output coefficient is proportional to the enterprise, the main interests of the level of eftbrt should be controlled in a reasonable range

关 键 词：公共自行车 利益主体 运营效益 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F572