财政压力、产能过剩与供给侧改革  

Fiscal Stress,Excess Capacity and Supply-side Reform

作　　者：席鹏辉[1] 梁若冰[2] 谢贞发[2] 苏国灿 XI Penghui LIANG Ruobing XIE Zhenfa SU Guocan(National Academy of Economic Strategy, CASS Department of Public Economics, School of Economics, Xiamen University)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院财经战略研究院 [2]厦门大学经济学院财政系

出　　处：《经济研究》2017年第9期86-102,共17页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573218;71673229);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71403289);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2016M601209);福建省自然科学基金计划资助项目(2017J01134);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(20720161013;20720171023)的资助

摘　　要：中国产能过剩问题自20世纪90年代末开始凸显,中央政府不断出台化解产能过剩的相关政策,但效果不符预期,这一问题值得深思。本文试图以地市增值税分成变化为切入视角,分析这一财力冲击对地方政府的财政激励效应。实证结果表明,地市政府积极应对增值税分成减少所形成的财政压力,努力发展能够带来大量增值税的产能过剩行业工业企业。最后,本文发现也证实这种"压力式"的财政激励使历次化解产能过剩政策的效果不佳。可以认为,财政压力是中国产能过剩形成和化解难问题的关键性因素。这对于供给侧改革具有重要启示。The Chinese government is committed to resolving overcapacity. Nevertheless, to this day overcapacity is unresolved and has even worsened. Therefore, the question considering why China＇s overcapacity pattern is difficult to change remains to be answered. The discussion of this issue has important practical significance for the structural transformation and sustainable development of China＇s future economy. This study argues that market mechanism theory can explain part of the phenomenon but cannot fundamentally explain overcapacity in China. Conversely, the government promotion theory proposes that surplus capacity stems from the unreasonable investment system and the government＇s benefit actuation. The literature lacks direct and micro empirical evidence about the motivation of local government behavior. One direct consequence is that even if the support means and policy tools are improved and optimized, due to an internal incentive mechanism, the local government often continues to ＂innovate＂, which ultimately fails to truly resolve overcapacity. This study makes some attempts to provide micro empirical evidence of the government promoting overcapacity industries from the perspective of fiscal pressure, and to explore the empirical effect of ＂ pressure type＂ fiscal incentives on overcapacity creation and problem resolution, which offers further evidence in favor of government promotion theory. Arguably, certain industries still make benefits in taxes and profits when they have a certain degree of excess capacity, which is the basis of fiscal incentives. Empirical results show that a reduction in the value-added tax （VAT） sharing rate increases the number of new enterprises in overcapaeity industries at the two-period lag time, and we find that the new capacity cannot be directly absorbed, thus reducing enterprises＇ capacity utilization. The common trends （placebo and reverse causality tests） indicate that the change in the VAT sharing rate has an exogenous nature. In addition, we find

关 键 词：增值税 税收分成 财政压力 产能过剩 

分 类 号：F424[经济管理—产业经济] F812.42