二元多项式环上密钥交换协议之密码分析  

Crypt analysis of a key exchange protocol based on a bivariate polynomial ring

作　　者：杨军[1] 陈建英[1] 方诗虹[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学计算机科学与技术学院,四川成都610041

出　　处：《西南民族大学学报（自然科学版）》2017年第5期504-507,共4页Journal of Southwest Minzu University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2014NYB04);教育部人文社科基金项目(12YJAZH004);四川省应用基础研究项目(2013JY0041)

摘　　要：密钥交换与加密、数字签名一起被公认是现代密码学中的三个密码原语和网络安全服务,但目前抗量子计算的密钥交换协议的研发远未成熟.2010年,Romańczuk和Ustimenko提出了一个公钥基础设施背景下基于有限域上矩阵群和多项式环的两方密钥交换协议.但在2012年,Blackburn,Cid和Mullan对其发起一种存在性攻击.首先分析这种攻击因被动敌手需要使用密码系统的一个秘密参数而无效的原因.其次针对教科书式RU协议缺乏数据源认证的局限性,具体构造了一种中间人攻击.分析结果表明:RU协议对此种在常见网络安全威胁模型下计算上可行的主动攻击是脆弱的.Alongside encryption and signatures, key exchange is recognized worldwide as one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in modern cryptography and a common network security service. However, the current research and development of key exchange protocols that are resistant toquantum computation have yet to be mature. In 2010,in the setting of public key in- frastructure Romanczuk and Ustimenko proposed a two-party key exchange protocol based on a matrix group and polynomial ring over a finite field. In 2012 ,however, Blackburn, Cid and Mullan amounted an existential attack on it. We first analyze the cause of why this attack becomes invalid due to the fact that the passive adversary had to utilize a secret system parameter. Aimed at the limitation of lack of data origin authentication in the textbook RU protocol, a man-in-the-middle attack was then constructed concretely. The crypt analysis shows that the RU protocol is vulnerable to this kind of active attack feasible in common network security threat models.

关 键 词：基于矩阵群的密码学 二元多项式环 密钥交换协议 密码分析 中间人攻击 

分 类 号：TN918.91[电子电信—通信与信息系统]