零售商公平关切下的生鲜品供应链协调机制  

Coordination mechanism for fresh agricultural supply chain under the retailer's fairness concerns

作　　者：张旭[1] 张庆[1] Zhang Xu Zhang Qing(School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2017年第4期461-473,共13页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171112;71371098)

摘　　要：针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链中零售商的公平关切特征,运用Nash讨价还价博弈理论构建了零售商的公平关切参照框架,建立了供应商和零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了零售商的公平关切对生鲜农产品供应链的运作产生的影响,并设计了基于改进旁支付自执行契约的协调机制.研究表明:在分散决策下,虽然零售商的公平关切既不会减轻也不会加剧双重边际效应,但会使供应商给其让渡部分收益,且零售商的公平关切度和谈判能力越强,供应商让渡的收益就越多;在执行改进旁支付自执行契约后,供应商和零售商能够在个人理性的分散决策下达到集中决策时的Pareto均衡解,同时实现决策目标的Pareto改进,且零售商的公平关切会逐渐增大由供应商流向零售商的旁支付.Based on retailer＇s fairness concerns in the supplier-dominated fresh agricultural supply chain,this paper first sets up a fair concerns reference framework of the retailer with Nash bargaining game theory,then sets up a Stackelberg game model of the supplier and the retailer, and next analyzes the impacts of the retailer＇s fairness concerns on the operation of fresh agricultural supply chain. The coordination mechanism is designed on the basis of the improved side-payment self-enforcing contract. The results indicate that the retailer＇s fairness concerns neither mitigate nor aggravate the double marginalization, but will make the supplier transfer some of his proceeds to the retailer under decentralized decision-making. More retailer＇s fairness concerns and bargaining power mean more proceeds transferred to the retailer. Both sides can achieve the same optimal solutions under decentralized decisions as that under centralized decisions according to individual rationality and achieve Pareto improvement for the decision-making objectives at the same time after executing the improved side-payment self-enforcing contract. The retailer＇s fairness concerns will gradually increase the side payment from the supplier to the retailer.

关 键 词：生鲜农产品 公平关切 改进旁支付自执行契约 协调机制 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]