信息不对称下制造商激励合同及价格策略研究  

The optimal price decision and incentive contract design under asymmetric information

作　　者：徐和[1] 彭伟真[1] Xu He Peng Weizhen(School of Management, Huazhong University of Science ＆ Technology, Wuhan 430074, Chin)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2017年第4期474-485,共12页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273092);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET110188)

摘　　要：针对成本信息不对称和价格可变的情形,构建了制造商从常规供应商和紧急供应商的订货模型.研究了紧急供应商的激励合同设计、制造商的最优订货量(与常规供应商)和价格决策问题,并比较了差异定价和统一定价两种方式对制造商决策和各企业期望利润的影响.研究表明:在差异定价情形下,制造商将对交货期较短的产品制定更低的产品销售价格.紧急供应商的存在将减少常规供应商的利润,并增加制造商的利润.与统一定价策略相比,采用差异定价策略将减少制造商向常规供应商的订货量,并提高其总体期望利润.Considering asymmetric cost information and endogenous prices, this paper studies a replenishment model in which a manufacturer sources from a main supplier and an emergent supplier. It derives parameters of incentive contracts for the emergent supplier, optimal replenishment order quantity（from the main supplier）and optimal prices. The manufacturer＇s optimal decisions and each party＇s profit under the differential pricing strategy and the uniform pricing strategy are comparatively analyzed. It is shown that the manufacturer chooses to set a lower price of short lead-time products under the differential pricing strategy. The manufacturer＇s profit increases and the main supplier＇s profit decreases in the presence of the emergent supplier. Compared with the uniform pricing strategy, the differential pricing strategy can decrease the replenishment order quantity from the main supplier and increase the manufacturer＇s total expected profit.

关 键 词：不对称信息 激励合同 差异定价 订货策略 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]