存在制造商竞争下的双渠道供应链模型研究  

Dual-channel supply chain with manufacturer competition

作　　者：李海[1] 崔南方[2] 徐贤浩[2] Li Hai Cui Nanfang Xu Xianhao(School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2017年第4期535-546,共12页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502176);湖北物流发展研究中心资助项目(2015A03)

摘　　要：应用Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了存在两个竞争性制造商和一个传统零售商的供应链中,领先制造商引入网络直销渠道形成双渠道供应链对原供应链决策的影响问题.研究表明,领先制造商在引入网络直销渠道的决策过程中应该充分考虑竞争对手的情况,只有在面对强势竞争对手的时候,才有必要引入网络直销渠道.而竞争性制造商却有可能因为领先制造商的网络直销渠道的引入而得到利润改善,这主要来自于网络直销渠道的去双重边际化带来的好处.领先制造商网络直销渠道的引入则会降低零售商利润.By using Stackelberg game model, this paper investigates how the introduction of online direct channel by the leading manufacturer influences the decisions of chain members in a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and a retailer. It shows that the leading manufacturer should consider the situation of competing manufacturers when introducing the online direct channel. Only when facing strong competitors,does the leading manufacturer need to introduce the online direct channel. The competing manufacturer＇s profit may be enhanced due to the introduction of online direct channel by the leading manufacturer, mainly because of the alleviation of the double marginalization problem in the online direct channel. In addition, the introduction of online direct channel will hurt the retailer＇s profit.

关 键 词：制造商竞争 双渠道供应链 零售商 网络直销渠道 博弈论 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]