经营性PPP项目中的市场风险与收益分配  

Market Risk and Revenue Allocation in the Operating PPP Project

作　　者：曲延芬[1] 

机构地区：[1]烟台大学经济管理学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《鲁东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第5期66-70,共5页Ludong University Journal:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划研究项目"蓝色经济区民间投资进入社会事业的市场化机制研究"(12CJJZ07);国家自然青年科学基金项目"交易契约视角下基于平台运行的创新授权优化研究"(71402158)

摘　　要：市场风险会导致经营性PPP项目的实际收益低于预期收益,继而影响项目的运营和质量。通过构建政府与社会资本的风险博弈模型,可以发现:在经营性PPP项目中,若社会资本被赋予定价和定量的决策权,随着市场风险的增大,政府部门将倾向于向社会资本转移控制权以规避市场风险;社会资本将减少提供的产品数量,并相应提高价格,消费者的福利水平亦随之降低。因此,在经营性PPP项目中,政府部门应根据预期风险选择最优的收益分配比例,同时,尽量避免因政府行为而导致的市场风险,以提高项目的整体社会福利水平。Market risk can lead to the lower actual revenue of operating PPP project than expected,and then affect its operation and quality. By constructing the risk game model of public authority and private sector,it can be found that if the private sector is given the pricing and quantitative decision-making power in the operating PPP project,the public authority tends to transfer the control power to the private sector in order to evade the increasing market risk and the latter will reduce the quantity of products and increase their prices accordingly. The consumers＇ welfare will be reduced,too. Therefore,in the operating PPP project,the public authority should choose the optimal proportion of revenue allocation according to the expected risk,and at same time try to avoid the market risk caused by the government＇s behavior so as to improve the overall social welfare level of the project.

关 键 词：经营性PPP项目 市场风险 收益分配 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]