论总统行政保密特权:以“合众国诉尼克松案”为切入点  

A Discussion on the President's Executive Privilege:United States v.Nixon as the Breakthrougat point

作　　者：张群[1] 韩姗姗 

机构地区：[1]北京大学近代法研究所,北京100871 [2]华东师范大学法学院,上海200241

出　　处：《北京电子科技学院学报》2017年第1期9-15,共7页Journal of Beijing Electronic Science And Technology Institute

摘　　要：总统行政保密特权的法理基础源于美国宪政原则下的三权分立制度,根据类型化区分,美国将该特权分为绝对、相对两种,其中相对行政保密特权经司法机构合理说明具有可司法性。通过分析"尼克松案"中总统行政保密特权的可司法性与特别检察官刑事追诉权,法院证据传票要求的合法性,政府决策过程、刑事审判公正的争议,论证总统行政保密特权可司法性的合理性。The legitimacy of the president＇ s executive privilege ica. According to the categorization, the president＇ s executive is stemmed privilege in from Trias Politica in AmerAmerica can be divided into two kinds, which are qualified executive privilege or absolute executive privilege. The president who has the qualified executive privilege is judicial if it is permitted by the judiciary. Executive privilege is judicial by analysis in controversies of judicial executive privilege and special counsel criminal prosecution, rationality of subpoena duces tecum, government policy, criminal justice from United States v. Nixon.

关 键 词：合众国诉尼克松案 行政保密特权 司法审查 证据传票 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]